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90 million missing females, and a $45 trillion gap
The fruits of misguided family planning
July 26, 2004
New York - While the United Nations and family planning groups continue in
their efforts to lower birthrates, several recent books have drawn attention to
the severe economic and social problems linked to having too few children.
One book, "Bare Branches: The Security Implications of Asia's Surplus Male
Population," takes a look at the consequences of an overabundance of young
adult males, called "bare branches" in Chinese. Valerie Hudson and Andrea den
Boer observe that China and India, with 38% of the world's population, have
surpluses of young males far beyond what any natural forces could produce.
The authors devote a chapter on the history of sex selection, noting that
female infanticide was practiced in many cultures and epochs. Asian culture has
had a particularly marked preference for male offspring, and modern technology
has allowed this preference to be applied much more radically than in the past.
A normal sex ratio at birth is 105-107 males born per 100 females. This
generally evens out, with a ratio for the total population close to 100 males
per 100 females. Reliable statistics on birth ratios are hard to come by, the
authors note. In China, studies on the level of sex ratios at birth range from
115.62 to 121.01 males per 100 females. India shows levels of 111 to 113, with
spikes of 132 and 156 in some localities. In South Korea, after reaching 116.9
in 1990, the number has stabilized at 109.6. In Taiwan, data from 200 show
109.5 males per 100 females at birth.
The imbalance at birth can be exacerbated in the following years due to a
higher level of infant mortality among females, attributed to a lack of
adequate medical care. Estimates on the numbers of "missing females" in Asia
vary. The book puts the number of women eliminated in seven Asian countries at
just over 90 million. India and China account for 43% and 45%, respectively, of
this total.
The authors calculate that by 2020 India will have a surplus male population in
the 15-35 year age span of between 28 million and 32 million. The corresponding
surplus in China could be 29 million to 33 million.
What will be the implications of so many surplus males? Drawing on multiple
studies, the authors describe a number of characteristics common to such a
group: low socioeconomic status due to a higher level of unemployment and
low-level jobs; a higher probability of criminal behavior; a distinctive
bachelor subculture characterized by the pursuit of immediate pleasure and a
lack of concern for the future; a tendency to turn to vice and violence.
Looking at historical evidence, the book observes that governments can take
measures to counteract the negative effects of sex ratio imbalances, but only
after long struggles and high costs. Asian countries, and in particular China
and India, the authors argue, have a difficult task ahead if they wish to avoid
a sharp rise in violence and social problems. Instability could also lead to
military conflict, the authors opine.
A threat to prosperity
Philip Longman, in his book "The Empty Cradle," concentrates on the economic
disadvantages of a rapidly falling birthrate. Fears of a "population bomb"
aside, modern economies have depended on ever-growing populations. New
businesses flock to areas where population is growing, and social security
systems depend on growing numbers of taxpayers to finance welfare for each
retiring generation.
He notes that it may seem counterintuitive to worry about too few children at a
time when the world population is still growing by around 75 million a year.
Fertility rates, however, have plummeted in recent years and no industrialized
nation has enough children being born to sustain its population. U.N. data show
that currently 59 countries, accounting for 44% of world population, are not
producing enough children to avoid population decline.
In the United States, even assuming high levels of immigration, by 2050 a fifth
of the population will be over 65. The Congressional Budget Office estimates
that costs for Medicare and Medicaid programs will soar from the current 4.3%
of the nation's economic output, to 21% in 2050. Longman warns that rising
welfare costs may oblige governments to increase taxes on workers, making it
harder for them to afford large families.
The problem is even worse in developing nations, which have seen the steepest
drops in fertility in a short time, he contends. By midcentury, for example,
populations in countries such as Mexico and Turkey could have a higher median
age than the United States.
U.N. projections contemplate a median age of 39.7 in the United States by 2050,
a rise of 4.5 years from the current level. Moreover, it took 50 years for the
United States to go from a median age of 30 to today's level. By contrast, in
the next half-century Mexico's median age will rise by 20 years, to 42.
Projections for the entire Latin American and Caribbean region put the median
age in 2050 at 39.8, a fraction higher than the United States.
Many other countries are in the same situation. In Algeria the median age is
set to climb from 21.7 in 2000 to 40 by 2050. Another rapidly aging society
will be China. By 2040 an estimated 26% of the population will be 60 or over.
And if rich countries have difficulty financing an aging population, developing
nations will face a much more difficult task, having become old before getting
rich.
Financial storms
The fiscal crunch facing the United States due to the costs of an aging
population is the subject of another book, "The Coming Generational Storm," by
Laurence Kotlikoff and Scott Burns.
The authors dedicate the greater part of their book to analyzing the financial
burden for the federal government of an older population. They accuse
politicians, of all parties, of deliberately ignoring the long-term financial
burdens in favor of short-term political interests.
The fiscal gap, the difference between the government's future receipts and
expenditures, will be in the order of $45 trillion, according to Kotlikoff and
Burns. Dealing with this gap, they calculate, will mean that the lifetime tax
payments faced by today's children will need to roughly double in size.
Increasing taxes on this order will lead to reductions in net incomes, and if
taxes on businesses are increased they will have less money to pay for capital
investment. They also point out that closing the fiscal gap will be more and
more painful the longer decisions are put off.
An alternative proposed by the authors is to implement deep changes in the
Social Security and Medicare systems, thus reducing future expenditures and
aligning their payments more fully with people's real needs. They also
recommend that people stop spending so much and start saving seriously for
retirement.
Some reviewers have found these three books too pessimistic in their
predictions. But even if the future isn't as bleak as some of these authors
describe, mainstream economic opinion is in agreement that the dramatic fall in
fertility will pose severe problems for the world's economy.
If tomorrow's governments find that the commitments they have inherited "have
drained their fiscal capacity to respond to adverse shocks, economic crisis and
political upheaval could be the result," concluded Peter Heller, deputy
director of the Fiscal Affairs Department of the International Monetary Fund in
his 2003 book "Who Will Pay?" Society may well rue the day it embraced the
logic of the family planning movement.
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China
hopes to fix gender imbalance among newborns by 2010
7-15-2003
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